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Property Institutions and Economic Development: 
Some Empirical Tests* 
Frederic L. Pryor 
Swarthmore College 
Ante lovem nulli subigebant arva coloni; ne signare quidem 
aut partiri limite campum fas erat: in medium quaerebant, 
ipsaque tellus omnia liberius, nullo poscente, ferebat. 
[VIRGIL]' 
A. Introduction 
The purpose of this essay is to examine quantitatively some factors influ- 
encing the origin, development, and continued existence of particular 
property institutions in 100 different economies and to test a number of 
hypotheses concerning such matters that are derived from simple deductive 
models. 
Property relations offer a rich field for exploration by comparative 
economists, but, unfortunately, analysis of property is usually left to the 
historian, jurist, or political scientist. Of course, certain aspects of property 
do have political or social elements, but this should not blind us to the 
important economic aspects of the institution as well. Some relations 
between property institutions and the level of economic development 
have been noted-particularly by Marxists-but such analyses have been 
neither systematic nor quantitative. 
In trying to dissect the effects of the level of economic development 
on property institutions, a number of serious problems arise in isolating 
* I would like to express my deep appreciation to Robert Carneiro who supplied 
the anthropological data used in this study. Thanks are also due to George Dalton, 
Norma Diamond, Victor Novick, Robert C. Mitchell, Zora Pryor, Scott Forman, and 
George Stolnitz for their helpful comments on a previous draft of this essay. I 
would also like to thank the International Development Research Center of Indiana 
University for partial financing of the project. 
1 Virgil, Georgicon, bk. 1, lines 120 ff. 
Ere [Jove], no peasant vex'd the peaceful ground, 
Which only turfs and greens for alters found: 
No fences parted fields, nor marks nor bounds 
Distinguish'd acres of litigious grounds. 
But all was common, and the fruitful earth 
Was free to give her unexacted birth. 
[Dryden translation] 
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modal institutions in complex economies. In this regard, it seems easier to 
confine the analysis to small and technologically simple societies; there- 
fore, only precapitalist economies are included in this empirical study. 
Much of the discussion of this paper lies on the relatively unexplored 
interface between economics and anthropology, and I have felt free to 
borrow techniques from both disciplines. 
The procedure followed is quite straightforward. In the next section, 
I present several simple cost/benefit models and deduce a series of hypo- 
theses. In the following section, I discuss certain statistical problems that 
are not usually faced in economic analysis. The hypotheses are put to test 
in the fourth section, and the results are summarized and expanded upon 
in the final part of the essay. 
B. Theoretical Observations 
1. Definitions 
In order to avoid ambiguity, simple definitions for "property," "property 
institutions," and "economic development" as used in this essay are 
presented below. 
Property is considered as a bundle of recognized relations (rights, 
obligations, claims, powers, privileges, or immunities) between people in 
regard to some good, service, or "thing" that has economic value. A 
number of terms in this definition, especially in regard to "recognition" 
and "economic value," give rise to analytical difficulties;2 but, for the 
purpose of this essay, the definition appears sufficient. 
Property institutions include, not only property rights, but the various 
customs and regulations that structure the exercise and the transfer of 
such rights. Exercising of particular rights is strongly influenced by the 
way in which rights are validated (or the acts by which such rights become 
recognized), including contract customs and the specificity with which 
rights are defined. The transferring of rights covers not only exchange 
procedures but inheritance institutions as well. Propositions in this essay 
cover a number of different types of such property institutions. 
Since I am dealing with many primitive economies, it is necessary to 
give an explicit definition of economic development, especially since the 
ranking of these societies according to their relative development level 
proved to be the most difficult statistical task of the analysis. 
In this essay, I define detelopment according to four criteria relating 
to the complexity of the economy: the division of labor, the level of tech- 
nology, the diversity of production above the barest food necessities, and 
the elaborateness of economic organizations. Although some have argued 
that these characteristics are not necessarily correlated and that it is possible 
to conceive of a society with a high level of technology but with a very 
2 These problems are nicely analyzed by Armen Alchian, "Some Economics of 
Property," RAND Corporation Paper 2316, May 26, 1961. 
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limited division of labor,3 empirical evidence presented below indicates 
that these four characteristics of complexity form a unilinear scale. Other 
problems in regard to this definition, especially in its application, are 
discussed in the text and footnotes below. 
2. Approach 
Two major assumptions underlie the approach of this study. 
a) The first assumption is that certain benefits and costs can be ad- 
duced for a given property institution; and, moreover, if these benefits 
and costs are analyzed in regard to the relevant societal groups, correct 
predictions can be made about the occurrence of the institution in particular 
economies.4 The application of this general assumption to particular 
cases, especially in the determination of the concrete benefits and costs or 
of the relevant groups in the society, raises a great many complex problems. 
Although I have chosen particular institutions for examination where such 
methodological problems do not arise too acutely, it is necessary to indicate 
briefly what kind of costs and benefits are relevant, especially since most 
of the societies considered in this study do not have market valuations on 
most of their goods and services. 
Benefits accrue to the owner of a particular property right if the 
"thing" under consideration has a positive marginal productivity or, in 
the case of consumption, has a positive marginal rate of substitution. In 
the case of production, this "value" is determined by such oft-discussed 
considerations as the level of technology, the availability of the thing, and 
the supply of other factors of production. And, with regard to consump- 
tion, the value is partly determined by individual preferences. 
Such a cost/benefit approach can be used in one of two ways. From 
particular cost/benefit considerations, we can set out certain economic (or, 
more specifically, developmental) considerations that are necessary for 
the occurrence of a particular property right or institution. Or, on the basis 
of additional considerations, we might argue that greater economic 
benefits than costs lead in all cases to the introduction of a particular 
right or institution, that is, that the specified economic conditions are 
sufficient for the existence of a particular right or institution. One such 
assumption might be that certain groups within primitive societies con- 
stantly try to maximize their economic positions, so that we can argue 
greater benefits than costs to a particular group leads in all cases to the 
3 Such issues are discussed by Martin Orans, "Surplus," Human Organization 25 
(Spring 1966): 24-32. 
4 This cost/benefit approach is followed in a number of essays and books on 
various aspects of property that have recently appeared: Harold Demsetz, "Toward 
a Theory of Property Relations," American Economic Review 56 (May 1967): 347- 
59; Mancur Olson, Jr., "Some Historic Variations in Property Institutions" (paper 
delivered at the Southern Economic Association Convention, Autumn 1967, New 
Orleans, La.); and Steven N. S. Cheung, The Theory of Share Tenancy (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1970). 
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existence of a particular right or institution. Verification of hypotheses 
stated in terms of either necessary or sufficient conditions gives rise to the 
same sorts of difficulties (e.g., specification and identification problems), 
but positive evidence for hypotheses stated in terms of necessary conditions 
does not need to be as strict as in the case of sufficient conditions. 
Although the cost/benefit approach may appear novel in the context 
of an institutional analysis of primitive societies, it is but one variant of 
"functionalism" that is practiced by some anthropologists. Unlike some 
varieties of functionalism, however, statistical tests can be set up so that 
propositions can be refuted; and, thus, we do not need to deal exclusively 
with tautologies. The hypotheses discussed below are stated only in terms 
of necessary conditions, which is the more moderate application of the 
cost/benefit approach; but quite adequate statistical tests can be carried 
out in these terms so that both negative and positive evidence can be sys- 
tematically evaluated. At the end of the essay, I also present certain evidence 
that the more extreme application of the cost/benefit approach also fits the 
data, and I present the results of further statistical tests. 
b) The second major assumption on which this essay rests is that, if 
the benefits and costs of particular property rights or institutions are 
related to the level of economic development, then such institutions should 
appear in a cluster of societies arranged according to their relative levels 
of development. In other words, if the property rights or institutions are 
related to an independent measure of economic development, they can be 
considered part of a unilinear scale of development. This, in turn, means 
that a point on the development scale can be designated such that societies 
at higher levels of development have the right or institution, while those 
at a lower level do not. If, for instance, a designated property right or 
institution is not present in the sixty poorest economies but is present in 
all of the forty richest, then it seems clear that such a right or institution is 
related to the level of economic development and that determination of the 
level of development of a society is sufficient to decide whether or not it 
has the right or institution under consideration. If, on the other hand, 
the right or institution exists in a pattern such as in every other economy 
along the development scale, then the hypothesis must be rejected. A 
third case arises when the property right of institution does not occur in 
the sixty poorest economies but is present in half of the forty richest; in 
this case, the level of economic development is a necessary but not suffi- 
cient condition for the occurrence of such a right or institution. 
In order to avoid misinterpretation, it should be noted that the rating 
of societies according to the way in which a subset of their properties fall 
along a unilineal scale does not imply that, if these societies change, 
their degree of development will rise; for the use of the development scale 
implies no probabilities about the possibilities of progressive versus 
regressive changes; and, moreover, many changes occurring within socie- 
ties may have no relation to those characteristics with which "develop- 
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ment" is determined. Other problems in regard to the definition or 
application of the development concept are discussed in the text and foot- 
notes below. 
3. Four Sets of Hypotheses 
The hypotheses tested below are grouped into four sets, according to the 
similarity of their justification or content. The first set of hypotheses con- 
cern the factors of production in which property rights exist; these hypo- 
theses have by far the most rigorous economic justification. The next 
two sets of hypotheses deal with the specificity of property rights and the 
institutions influencing them, especially in regard to the transfer and 
delineation of such rights. And a final set of hypotheses concern the gener- 
ality of such rights, that is, the degree to which particular economic 
relations are independent of specific "things" and are institutionalized 
into money. 
a) Property rights in factors of production.5-Property rights in men 
in the form of slavery and in land are the rights most capable of analysis 
with the proposed cost/benefit approach. 
In regard to slavery, a general proposition can be simply stated: 
slaves are held only if they can produce enough of economic value to more 
than cover the cost of maintaining them, fitting them out for work, and 
guarding them.6 If we also assume that unimproved land is available in 
sufficient quantities that land rents cannot be easily collected, then a 
number of corollaries and specific hypotheses can be derived from the 
general proposition. 
In most situations, it is clearly less expensive in terms of resources 
to guard slaves from running away if the slaves work together in a group, 
where they can be more closely watched (e.g., in agriculture), rather than 
if they work in small groups over a large area (e.g., hunting and gathering). 
Hypothesis Al: Slavery appears only in predominantly agricultural 
societies and does not appear in hunting and gathering societies, other 
things remaining equal. Since the data show that primary reliance on 
5 The propositions in this section are based on several concepts such as "slavery" 
and "subsistence level," about which there is heated controversy. Starting from Harry 
Pearson's famous essay ("The Economy has no Surplus," in Trade and Market in 
Early Empires, ed. Karl Polanyi et al. [Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957], pp. 320-42) 
a considerable body of literature has arisen concerning the meaning of "subsistence 
level." Similarly, problems arise in determining what degree of rights of one individual 
over another constitute slavery. But, no matter how hard it may be to draw lines in 
particularly ambiguous cases, these distinctions rest on gross differences that can be 
distinguished in most cases. (For "level of subsistence," see Marvin Harris, "The 
Economy Has No Surplus ?" American Anthropologist 61 [April 1959]: 185-99.) That 
is, the terms can be operationalized in a more or less adequate manner; a description 
of the way in which this was carried out in the data I am using will be published in a 
forthcoming book by Robert Carneiro. 
6 These hypotheses about slavery are taken directly from Olson (n. 4 above). 
Among other things, they rest on the assumption that sufficient land is available that 
land rents cannot be easily obtained (see Evsey Domar, "The Causes of Slavery or 
Serfdom: A Hypothesis," Journal of Economic History 30 [March 1970]: 18-32). 
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hunting and gathering for food production occurs only at relatively low 
levels of development, this hypothesis thus relates slavery to the relative 
level of economic development. 
Since slaves do not receive many fruits of their labor above the barest 
necessities, they have little incentive in most cases (unless they can buy 
their freedom) for working very hard and, as a consequence, are probably 
less productive than free men. From this consideration, we can argue that 
slavery does not pay the slave owner unless the technological level of the 
society is high enough so that the average product of labor in the fields is 
much more than sufficient to just feed the worker. Hypothesis A2: Slave- 
holding in a society does not occur until there is a regular surplus of food 
produced above the needs of the food producers; that is, the society is 
well above the bare subsistence level, other things remaining equal.7 
The net costs (production minus maintenance) of slaves are less if 
slaves are obtained as adults rather than as children, since there are fewer 
costs involved in teaching them the necessary skills of production.8 
Hypothesis A3: Therefore, extratribal slavery should be more frequent 
than intratribal slavery, and the latter should occur only in societies with 
relatively higher levels of economic development, other things remaining 
the same. 
Before turning to the hypotheses about land, three features of these 
hypotheses which hold for the other fourteen hypotheses as well must be 
briefly noted. First, because of their simplicity, the three hypotheses avoid 
many of the complications that could occur if the cost/benefit approach 
were applied to more complex situations. Second, the hypotheses are not 
rigorous in the sense that sufficient conditions are established; however, 
necessary conditions are put forth which can be statistically tested. And 
finally, the ceteris paribus condition at the end of each hypothesis is 
quite important, since it allows a certain random condition. This means 
that, above or below the critical level of development that is relevant to 
the hypothesis, there may be certain societies that do not fit exactly into 
the predicted patterns.9 If the random element is too great, the hypothesis 
7 Friedrich Engels (The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State 
[New York: International Publishers, n.d.]) presented arguments similar to these to 
prove the existence of slavery societies that had passed a certain level of economic 
development. His analysis differs from mine in two major respects: first, he argued 
that development is a sufficient condition, while here I contend merely that it is a 
necessary condition for slavery; second, he argued in terms of societies where the 
economy is based primarily on slavery, while I am concerned only with the existence 
of slavery, even though it may not be of critical importance to the economic function- 
ing of the society. 
8 If slave-raiding parties are organized to obtain slaves from other tribes, then 
the costs of extratribal slavery are not zero; in most cases, however, slaves are obtained 
as a by-product from other activities such as war and, as a result, have a low marginal 
cost. There are also, of course, certain training costs of extratribal slaves as well. All 
of these costs seem lower in most cases than the resource costs of raising slaves. 
9 For instance, the justification for hypothesis A2 is in terms of the average 
product of labor. However, if the marginal productivity of labor is very much lower 
411 
This content downloaded from 130.58.65.20 on Tue, 28 Apr 2015 19:56:01 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Economic Development and Cultural Change 
does not hold; the use of a probability model does, however, allow us to 
distinguish between these two cases. 
In a situation where unimproved land is available for all and where 
agricultural technology is very simple, there are no economic justifications 
for claims longer than one planting cycle on a particular piece of land. If 
cultivators of land use a technology such that agricultural practices in one 
year affect productivity in the next year, then there are some obvious 
economic benefits to those making improvements (investments) in a 
particular piece of land to assert long-term claims on its use. Hypothesis 
A4: Therefore, we would expect above a certain point on the development 
scale to find continuous ownership (disposition) rights by individuals or 
families over land which has been improved, even after the cultivated plot, 
house site, etc., is abandoned, other things remaining the same. If land 
plots become relatively scarce, this tendency toward continuous-ownership 
claims on use is reinforced (see also below). 
We are now at a point to see an important possible relationship 
between inequality and the level of development. If improvement of land 
brings considerable returns or if slaveholding is profitable, then property 
income can become important, and a source of income inequality arises. 
Indeed, the higher the productivity of labor, the more beneficial real and 
slave property can be to its owner. Furthermore, since there are certain 
economies of scale of protection (if a piece of land can be successfully 
guarded by a watchman walking the perimeter, then two watchmen can 
guard four times the property that one watchman can, since the area 
increases to the square as the boundary doubles), the benefits of property 
inequality rise more than the cost when more property is obtained or when 
the productivity of property rises. Thus, at higher levels of economic 
development, there are necessary conditions for greater economic 
inequality. 
For someone holding claims on the use of land to obtain large eco- 
nomic benefits from his land, it is often necessary for some part of the land 
to be cultivated by slaves or tenants. As long as free land is available or 
land distant from the community on which it is difficult for those holding 
nominally exclusive rights to enforce their claims, then tenancy does not 
pay the tenant, since he can always get the use of certain lands for himself 
without paying for their use. It is economic scarcity, either natural or 
contrived, that make tenancy inescapable for landless agriculturalists. 
There are, as many have noted, certain positive relations between 
economic development and land scarcity. It is well known that economic 
development is positively related to sizes of communities, and a scarcity 
than the average product, the hypothesis will not hold, and the pattern of slave- 
holding societies on the development scale will appear quite irregular. By including 
the case of a considerable difference between marginal and average productivity 
among the "random factors," however, the analysis can proceed if a probability 
model is used for testing the hypotheses. 
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arises of land "close" to the community. "Closeness" can, of course, be 
affected by the methods of transportation, the sphere of military influence, 
etc.; but these should not blind us to the basic relationships that can exist 
between land scarcity and development. 
The necessary conditions for land tenancy thus rest on the existence 
of economic inequality and an economic scarcity of land. And, above a 
certain point on the development scale, the necessary conditions for these 
two factors also exist. We thus arrive through a chain of reasoning1o to 
Hypothesis A5: At a relatively high level along the development scale, 
rental of land by landlords to tenants will appear as a common system of 
tenure, other things remaining the same. 
Up to now, I have made no distinction between individual and family 
"claims on the use of some land." It seems to be commonly agreed among 
anthropologists that property rights by single individuals in personal items 
and movable property is manifested at quite low levels of economic 
development; individual (as opposed to family) property rights of land 
appears at a much higher level of development. From the cost/benefit 
standpoint from which I have been arguing, a number of reasons can be 
adduced to support such a proposition. For instance, the higher the amount 
of production over cost (net production) from a particular piece of land, 
the more an individual property holder can afford to buy protection for 
his property rather than relying on his family. And the higher the net 
production and the greater the effects of investment on a particular piece 
of land, the more the economic interests of a single individual who is 
working a piece of land can diverge from those of his family. And the 
higher the net production and the greater the effects of investment on a 
particular piece of land, the more the economic interests of a single 
individual who is working a piece of land can diverge from those of his 
family. Unfortunately, I do not have sufficient data to test any proposition 
about the increasing importance of individual property claims in land at 
higher levels of economic development in a direct fashion."1 Indirect 
evidence is, however, available from the examination of inheritance insti- 
tutions, and it is to such matters that we now turn. 
b) The transfer ofproperty rights.-The above hypotheses all deal with 
the kinds of rights that are exercised over particular factors of production. 
The cost/benefit analysis can also be applied to property institutions, of 
10 There is also a hidden assumption that higher labor productivity is necessarily 
associated with a higher level of economic development, a relationship that has been 
disputed by some (e.g., Orans [n. 3 above]) but which has sufficient weight for the 
burden of proof to be on those that dispute it. This proposition has also been often 
argued on noneconomic grounds. 
11 Some data on this matter are presented by Robert B. Textor (A Cross-cultural 
Summary [New Haven, Conn.: Human Relations Area File Press, 1967]) in his 
"finished characteristic" 135. Unfortunately, data for only fourteen societies whose 
relative level of economic development are determined in this study are presented. 
This seems too small a sample from which to draw conclusions. 
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which an important class includes those institutions which structure the 
delineation and transfer of property rights between members of society. 
In regard to delineation and transfer institutions, the general (and 
almost tautological) proposition underlying the hypotheses below is quite 
simple: the higher the level of economic development and the greater the 
wealth, the greater the possibilities of serious disputes over wealth and the 
more there is at stake in such disputes. Greater wealth thus gives rise to 
greater benefits in explicit delineation of property rights and the ways in 
which property can be transferred.12 Since the costs of institutions con- 
cerning such matters need not be great and since the benefits are greater at 
higher levels of development, a number of testable hypotheses can be 
quickly derived. 
If there is not appreciable accumulation of wealth, the disposition of 
personal wealth after death is not very important; and, without much loss 
to anyone, such wealth could even be destroyed. However, at some level 
of economic development, such accumulation of individual wealth will 
become important enough to be desired by heirs, and the benefits of in- 
heritance rules become apparent. Hypothesis BI: At some point along the 
scale of economic development, most individual property in goods is 
transmitted by inheritance rather than being destroyed at the death of the 
owner, other things remaining equal. 
If the above proposition is true, then, from the considerations dis- 
cussed above about the emergence of individual as opposed to family 
property in land, it would seem likely that inheritance of movable property 
would precede inheritance of landed (real) property.13 Hypothesis B2: 
Formal inheritance procedures appear at lower level on the development 
scale for movable than for real property, other things remaining the same. 
From the general proposition, it should also be apparent that, the 
greater the wealth, the greater the benefits of highly formal procedures of 
12 One possible ambiguity in these and the following remarks arises because 
different evaluations may be placed on such wealth. As the level of development 
rises, the "amount" of wealth in a society rises when measured in constant prices (or 
when considered in sheer physical terms); but, when measured in current prices (or 
in current opportunity costs), the situation is not so clear. It is useful to distinguish 
here between wealth in long-lasting consumer goods and in factors of production. In 
the case of consumer goods, we have evidence that the income elasticity of demand is 
considerably greater than unity, so that the amount of such wealth, when measured 
in current opportunity costs, increases with a rising level of economic development. 
In regard to wealth in land, as productivity rises, the value of the produce of the land 
rises, and, ceteris paribus, we might expect that the relative exchange value of the land 
would rise. A similar argument can be adduced for capital; and, in addition, it is 
possible that the capital/output ratio of the society might also increase-at least to a 
certain plateau-because of the increase in the physical amount of capital as well. 
13 As many anthropologists have argued (e.g., Melville J. Herskovits, Economic 
Anthropology [New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1952], chap. 15), even very primitive 
hunting and gathering societies have familial property rights in land. Both real and 
movable properties exist in all societies of the sample, so that the proposition cannot 
be argued on the grounds that real property does not exist at certain levels of develop- 
ment. 
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inheritance, especially since the latter are not necessarily much more 
expensive. Hypothesis B3: At a relatively high stage of economic develop- 
ment, testamentary disposition of property appears, either by a written 
will, through a formal executor, or orally in the presence of a witness, 
other things remaining equal. 
In addition to inheritance institutions, other arrangements exist for 
the transfer of property. Special situations arise in the cases of individual 
property where the owners die without direct descendants (for the inherit- 
ance rules to apply) or heirs (for the testamentary rules to apply). The more 
valuable the property, the more beneficial to the political leaders that its 
disposition be regularized by intervention from the government of the 
society. In the case of land, such regularization would appear at a further 
point on the development scale than where continuous claims of ownership 
rights by individuals or families would appear. Hypothesis B4: At a rela- 
tively high stage of development, agricultural land would revert to the 
chief, king, or state as personal property or for reassignment when the 
owner abandons the lands or dies without heirs (i.e., escheat), other things 
remaining the same. 
A final aspect of the transfer of property rights concerns the proce- 
dures for forfeiting such rights. One traditional way of forfeiting any 
kind of rights is by punishment for some kind of crime or violation of 
societal rules. At higher levels of economic development, as noted above, 
individual wealth is greater, and it becomes increasingly possible to punish 
a person by confiscating his property. Since this procedure is easier and 
less expensive to administer than other types of punishment involving 
compensation and since there can be more at stake in such a transaction at 
higher levels of development, the necessary conditions for its appearance 
should be clear. Hypothesis B5: At some state of economic development, 
certain offenses begin to be punished by confiscation of property (of 
which part may go to the offended party), other things remaining the same. 
c) Delineation of property rights.-Problems of the delineation of 
rights occur, not only in inheritance situations, but also in the very exercise 
of such rights. Such delineation can be almost costless, and, according to 
the general proposition stated in the above subsection, the benefits 
increase with more and more wealth at stake. 
Delineation of the land area over which an individual or family has 
rights of use can be used to verify a corollary to the general proposition, 
for, once productivity of improved land is much greater than unimproved 
land or once land has some scarcity value, the benefits of strictly defining 
the boundaries of such property become apparent. Hypothesis Cl: Shortly 
after the point on the development scale where landed property occurs, 
there should also arise the existence of continuous boundaries such as 
fences, rows or walls of stone, paths, ditches, or hedges to delimit agricul- 
tural fields, other things remaining equal. This is not a very strong hypo- 
thesis but points the direction toward more interesting propositions. 
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With higher levels of economic development and greater productivity 
of land, there are increasing benefits for continually more formal delinea- 
tion of land rights. Hypothesis C2: At a relatively high stage of economic 
development, there should arise a formal inscription of land or other forms 
of property through a registry of deeds, other things remaining the same. 
The public inscription of wealth has benefits to the society as a whole 
as well as the individual; the private recording of wealth benefits primarily 
the individual. The greater the wealth, the more property rights can be 
exercised, and the greater the benefits of the private recording of wealth so 
as to exercise such benefits to the greatest advantage. Thus, there is a 
relationship between economic development, wealth, and the benefits of 
such management devices. Hypothesis C3: At some point along the develop- 
ment scale, probably preceding the appearance of the public inscription of 
wealth, private recorded inventories of wealth should appear, other things 
remaining the same. 
d) Generalized property rights: money.-Up to now, we have been 
discussing property rights and institutions associated with very specific 
goods, services, and things, for example, pieces of land, rights in people, 
personal items, and so forth. But it should also be apparent that certain 
property rights can be defined in a more general and indirect way so that 
they represent a series of more specific property rights. Thus, we can have 
command over resources or goods in two ways: direct property rights in 
each resource or good or a generalized property right which allows such 
resources or goods to be obtained or used. There are two major benefits of 
such generalized property rights. 
First, as the number of different goods available for domestic trading 
increases, the number of possible different trades (i.e., pairs of goods in 
exchange) rises even faster (according to the well-known combinatorial 
rules). This is the origin of the problem of the "coincidence of wants," the 
oft-discussed difficulty of finding a trading partner with complementary 
needs and surpluses. A generalized property right such as money greatly 
facilitates trade. 
Second, as wealth increases, the ease of managing such wealth in- 
creases when the different types of property rights can be expressed accord- 
ing to common numeraire. Although exchange value, as measured in 
monetary prices, catches only one facet of such property rights, it is an 
important one; and the positive relationship between the benefits of a 
generalized property right and the amount of individual wealth should be 
apparent. 
Higher levels of economic development are associated with greater 
per-capita trade and greater individual wealth. Thus, the benefits of a 
generalized property right is positively associated with the level of eco- 
nomic development. Furthermore, the costs of such a generalized right are 
probably independent of the level of development or even inversely related 
(since more advanced technologies allow more usable moneys to be made 
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more easily). From these considerations, we can frame a general proposi- 
tion: At higher levels of economic development, the necessary conditions 
for the use of increasingly more elaborate generalized property rights 
appear. A number of simple deductions from this proposition can be made. 
One of the least elaborate generalized property rights is a standardized 
medium of exchange which serves in particular circumstances a money 
role.14 Hypothesis DI: At some point on the development scale, a stan- 
dardized medium of exchange appears, other things remaining the same. 
A more formal (and possibly more costly) generalized property right 
occurs when the medium of exchange is given a highly standardized form. 
Hypothesis D2: At a higher stage of development, one or more types of 
coined money will appear, other things remaining the same. 
The development of money lessens the cost not only of individual 
exchange but of public exchange as well. Transfer of goods and services 
to the political leaders by the population appears easier. With wider use 
of a standardized medium of exchange, the process can be simplified and 
the administrative costs lowered by carrying out such transactions, at 
least partly, in the form of money. Hypothesis D3: At the same or higher 
development stage, taxes are collected in money, other things remaining 
the same. It must be explicitly noted that argumentation for this proposi- 
tion runs contrary to the suggestion sometimes found in the anthropological 
literature that noncommercial uses of money preceded commercial uses. 
These three hypotheses are, of course, quite obvious. A more difficult 
situation to analyze is a generalized property right for the temporary use of 
goods or resources. This can be examined by noting that paralleling the 
emergence of generalized property relations and the development of ex- 
change is a much clearer recognition of opportunity costs. As long as 
goods cannot be easily exchanged for other goods, the opportunity costs 
of temporarily lending particular goods to someone else cannot, in many 
cases, be easily measured. If goods have prices on them, loans can be more 
easily viewed in terms, not only of forgone consumption, but also of 
missed investment opportunities; that is, the costs of a loan to the lender 
become more apparent. Since an interest charge is a generalized right for 
compensation for the opportunity costs of lending and since these costs 
become more apparent in situations where there is a standardized medium 
of exchange (and where opportunity costs can be easily calculated), we 
can thus see a link between the level of development and economic 
14 Many primitive economies do not have money in the sense of a completely 
generalized medium of exchange, unit of account, store of value, and standard of 
deferred payment, but rather limited-purpose monies serving one or two of these 
functions for a limited range of transactions. (This is explicated by George Dalton, 
"Primitive Money," American Anthropologist 67 [February 1965]: 44-65.) In the 
following hypotheses, I am not concerned about some money-stuff that plays all of the 
roles of money, but rather about a money-stuff that plays the role of a medium of 
exchange for an appreciable range of ordinary goods and services. The exact coding 
definitions of such "money" will be presented in a forthcoming book by Robert 
Carneiro. 
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conditions for the existence of interest. Hypothesis D4: At a point on the 
development scale after the introduction of a standardized medium of 
exchange, money or goods begin to be lent out at interest, other things 
remaining the same. It must be noted that, although the emergence of 
interest has been argued on social and other grounds as well, no such 
specific hypothesis about the point of origin has been enunciated, at least 
in the literature I have been able to locate. 
On the whole, many of the seventeen hypotheses discussed above are 
common in the literature of economics or anthropology. And many have 
been justified or explained by a variety of social, political, and ecological 
reasons. Although the very simple benefit/cost arguments outlined above 
may seem quite naive to those who are aware of the complexity of most 
primitive societies and of the importance of analyzing economic institu- 
tions in a societal context, it is also important to bear in mind Ockham's 
principle of simplicity and the analytical advantages of linking a variety 
of seemingly unrelated phenomena to a single principle. We return to such 
questions at the end of the paper; it seems better to explore the statistical 
methods and to see if the hypotheses are verified before examining these 
more abstract and broader issues. 
C. Statistical Problems 
Two major statistical problems must be faced before the propositions 
stated above can be tested: The first is devising a method to rank the various 
primitive societies according to their relative levels of economic develop- 
ment; the second is obtaining sufficient data to carry out such a task. Each 
of these difficulties is discussed in turn below. 
1. Determining the Relative Level of Economic Development 
The major analytic tool used here for ranking societies according to their 
relative level of economic development is the scalogram analysis devised 
by Louis Guttman 15 and applied in the analysis of development of primi- 
tive economies by Robert L. Carneiro.16 Since this technique may be 
15 Louis Guttman's early work on scaling techniques is summarized in Samuel 
A. Stouffer, Louis Guttman, et al., Measurements and Prediction (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1950). The most useful descriptions of numerical tech- 
niques in scaling that we have found are: Allen L. Edwards, Techniques of Attitude 
Scale Construction (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc. 1957), and Warren S. 
Torgerson, Methods of Scaling (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958). Scaling 
techniques have been continually improved with the introduction of computer 
methods, but none of the available programs could be used with the extremely large 
data matrix used in this study. 
16 Carneiro and his associates have written a series of essays on the subject, 
including: "Scale Analysis as an Instrument for the Study of Cultural Evolution," 
Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 28 (Summer 1962): 149-69; (with Stephen F. 
Tobias) "The Application of Scale Analysis to the Study of Cultural Evolution," 
Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences, 2d ser. 26 (1963): 196-207; "On 
the Relation between Size of Population and Complexity of Social Organization," 
Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 23 (Autumn 1967): 234-44; "Scale Analysis, 
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unfamiliar to economists, a brief explanation is warranted. The key idea 
behind the scalogram analysis is the "dichotomous cumulative trait." 
A trait is dichotomous if there are only two possible ratings that the 
thing rated (e.g., persons, societies, etc.) can take. For instance, for a person 
the trait "being six feet tall or over" is dichotomous, while height in feet is 
not, since a person's height can take an infinite number of values. 
For a group of societies, a set of traits are "cumulative" if a society 
with a higher ranking has all the traits of a society with a lower rank plus 
a number of additional traits. This also means that, if trait A ranks above 
trait B, the former trait is possessed by all the societies that possess the 
latter plus a number of additional societies. A different way of looking at 
this cumulative phenomenon is to examine rankings of societies or traits 
using different subsets of societies and traits; a society that ranks higher 
than another on one scale (i.e., using one subset of traits) maintains this 
relative position when another scale is used; and a trait that is possessed 
by more societies than another also maintains this relative position with 
other scales (i.e., using another subset of societies). A further implication 
is that, if we are given the relative position of a trait, we can predict what 
societies possess it. 
A simple example of a set of dichotomous, cumulative traits is a set 
of traits based on the height continuum. Let us suppose that we have four 
traits: (1) being four feet tall or over; (2) being five feet tall or over; (3) 
being six feet tall or over; (4) being seven feet tall or over. Each of these is 
a dichotomous trait. Furthermore, if a person scores positively in only 
one trait, it must be the first; in two traits, the first two on the list. If one 
person has a higher rating than another, then he must score as high or 
higher on all the traits in the scale. 
This scalogram technique can be extended to the level of economic 
development quite easily. One hoary proposition is that, the higher the 
level of economic development, the greater the division of labor. Let us 
select the following four different measures of division of labor: the 
existence of a political leader who is a full-time specialist (i.e., does not 
regularly engage in subsistence agriculture); the existence of a full-time 
teacher (i.e., professional, secular instructor); the existence of a special 
full-time religious practitioner (e.g., priest); and the existence of a full- 
time craft specialist (e.g., brewer, lapidary, tailor, baker, tanner, etc.). 
Taking four primitive societies, the Rwala, the Ancient Incas, the Thonga, 
and the Semang, we can obtain the data which are given in table 1 below 
(the figure 1 indicates the existence of the trait; 0, its absence). 
Evolutionary Sequences, and the Rating of Cultures," in Handbook of Method in 
Anthropology, ed. Raoul Naroll and Ronald Cohen (New York: Natural History 
Press, 1970); "Ascertaining, Testing, and Interpreting Sequences of Cultural Develop- 
ment," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 24 (Winter 1968): 354-74; and (with 
Daisy F. Hilse) "The Measurement of Cultural Evolution in the Ancient Near East 
and in Anglo-Saxon England," forthcoming. 
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TABLE 1 
EXISTENCE OF FULL-TIME OCCUPATIONS IN FOUR SOCIETIES: 
UNREARRANGED DATA 
TRAITS 
Political Secular Religious Craft Total 
SOCIETIES Leader Teacher Practitioner Specialist per Society 
Rwala .............. 1 0 1 0 2 
Ancient Incas ........ 1 1 1 1 4 
Thonga ............. 1 0 1 1 3 
Semang ............. 0 0 1 0 1 
Total societies per 
trait ............ 3 1 4 2 
If the rows and columns can be rearranged in order so that the l's 
form a "triangle," then we have a set of cumulative traits forming a Gutt- 
man scale. As a start, it is useful to rearrange the rows and columns in 
ascending order of the total traits. The results are given in table 2 below. 
A Guttman scale can indeed be formed from the societies and traits 
since the 1-values form a triangle."7 Thus, the extent of the division of 
labor appears to be a unidimensional scale. From such results, we can 
also conclude that the Semang have the lowest and the Ancient Incas had 
the highest level of economic development, a conclusion that seems quite 
reasonable from what we know from the literature dealing with these two 
societies.18 
TABLE 2 
EXISTENCE OF FULL-TIME OCCUPATIONS IN FOUR SOCIETIES: 
REARRANGED DATA 
TRAITS 
Secular Craft Political Religious Total Traits 
SOCIETIES Teacher Specialist Leader Practitioner per Society 
Semang ............. 0 0 0 1 1 
Rwala .............. 0 0 1 1 2 
Thonga ............. 0 1 1 1 3 
Ancient Incas ........ 1 1 1 1 4 
Total societies per 
trait ............ 1 2 3 4 
17 "Triangle" is a shorthand description of the fact that the line connecting the 
cutoff point (described below) must always proceed upward or to the left (assuming 
that the data are arranged as in table 2). 
18 One problem of interpretation of "economic development" arises because we 
are dealing with societies of greatly different sizes (e.g., the Incas and the Semang). 
A very small society, no matter how high its level of technology, would have certain 
limitations placed on its division of labor; while a society composed of a large number 
of people is likely to have a certain division of labor with a relatively low level of 
technology. (For instance, if it is politically centralized, there will be full-time political 
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Before turning to more specific problems of calculating a Guttman 
scale for the problem at hand, several general observations about his 
approach are offered in order to avoid misunderstanding. 
First of all, the use of this method does not rest on any theory about 
how specific societies function or change. There is nothing in this technique 
that is based on any particular theory of economic development, except 
insofar as any theory is predicated on the implicit notion that "economic 
development" or "complexity of the economy" is a unidimensional con- 
tinuum. Similarly, this technique does not rest on the approaches of 
evolutionalist, diffusionist, structural-functionalist, or structuralist schools 
in anthropology.19 
Second, this approach does not imply that other aspects of societies, 
especially those where economic elements may play a more secondary role 
(e.g., family structure, religious beliefs, or political forms), are necessarily 
related to the derived rankings of relative economic development, and, 
indeed, experiments along these lines showed that there were few such 
relationships.20 
Third, the proof that the traits selected actually form a cumulative 
scale can only be seen in the process of rearranging the rows and columns 
to form such a scale. That is, although the traits are originally chosen on 
the basis of various a priori hypotheses about their relation to "economic 
development" (see below), the only indication of whether we chose the 
traits correctly is whether or not they form a unidimensional (cumulative) 
scale. 
officials and religious specialists.) However, it should be clear that the level of develop- 
ment and the size of a functioning economy are probably positively related: the small 
society with a high level of technology would find it advantageous to grow in size (e.g., 
through conquest) in order to utilize such technology through a more extensive divi- 
sion of labor; similarly, a large society with a low level of technology would probably 
not (except for the political and religious factors mentioned above) act as a single 
economic unit, so that the division of labor outside the several centralized political 
functions would be quite limited. Since 156 traits covering a wide number of economic 
activities in these societies are used, the scaling technique to determine the level of 
development should, in most cases, transcend the influence of size sufficiently so that 
the effects of the letter can be treated as a random element. Finally, it must be added 
that many of the hypotheses to be tested cannot be justified on the basis of scale or 
economic complexity; and, since it turns out that all of the hypotheses are validated, 
we have some justification in believing that the scaling technique actually does measure 
the relative level of development. 
19 This technique has been employed by neoevolutionists such as Carneiro, but 
is not an exclusive tool of this approach. That is, there is no assumption that, when 
societies change, they necessarily change in a forward direction indicated by develop- 
ment scale. 
20 I conducted a statistical fishing expedition with the 536 "finished characteris- 
tics" presented by Textor (n. 11 above) to see how many of these are significantly 
related to the level of economic development. Almost none of the social variables 
(especially those dealing with family structure) and few of the religious, political, and 
other noneconomic variables showed such a relationship. The investigation was 
complicated by the fact that, for many of the variables, the sample was quite small. 
For those noneconomic variables that do correlate, see Carneiro and Tobias (n. 16 
above). 
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Finally, if the rating of the societies according to the selected traits 
contains errors, or if the traits selected do not truly reflect a particular 
place on the economic development scale, or if economic development is a 
multidimensional phenomenon, then certain "nonscale elements" appear 
in the matrix; that is the 1-values do not form a triangle. If this is the case, 
then two procedures must be followed. First, we must devise a way to 
measure the degree of difference from a perfect scale in order to ascertain 
whether or not such deviation is systematic or random. Second, we must 
devise procedures to improve the scaling by rearranging the rows and 
columns in a different way. 
Louis Guttman has introduced the concept of "reproducibility" as a 
measure of approximation to a perfect scale. The "coefficient of reproduci- 
bility" is a measure of approximation to a perfect scale and is defined as 
united minus the ratio of errors (a 0-value where a 1-value should be, and 
vice versa) to the total number of scaled items in the matrix. By maximizing 
the coefficient of reproducibility, the probability of correctly predicting 
the traits that a society possesses increases. The concept of error is slippery, 
however, for there are several techniques to determine what traits a society 
"should" possess. This is the problem of establishing the "cutoff" or 
"cutting points," that is, the place in the rank order of societies where the 
most common response shifts from a 0-value to a 1-value. The difficulty 
can be most clearly seen in a numerical example given in table 3 below. 
Using a technique by Goodenough and Edwards, the cutoff point is 
determined by the number of societies per trait. Thus, for trait 1, the cutoff 
point is three from the bottom, while, for trait 4, it is seven from the bot- 
tom. These are drawn in with long straight lines (for a moment the short 
TABLE 3 




SOCIETIES 1 2 3 4 per Society 
1 ........ 0 0 0 0 
2........ 0 0 0 1 1 
3........ 0 0 1 0 1 
4........ 1 0 0 0 1 
5........ 0 0 1 1 2 
6........ 0 1 0 1 2 
7........ 0 0 1 1 2 
8 ........ 0 1 1 1 3 
9 ........ 1 1 1 1 4 
10 ....... 1 1 1 1 4 
Total 
societies 
per trait. 3 4 6 7 
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lines should be neglected). Thus, the Goodenough-Edwards technique 
gives an unambiguous method of ranking societies and traits (except in 
cases of tie scores) and, it should be clear, an unambiguous coefficient of 
reproducibility, even when tie scores among the traits or societies occur.21 
In the above example, there are eight errors and forty (4 x 10) ratings, so 
that the coefficient of reproducibility is 1 - (8/40) = .80. 
It should be clear that the coefficient of reproducibility can be raised 
by changing the cutoff lines used in calculating the coefficient. For trait 
1, the total number of errors can be reduced by placing the cutoff line above 
society 9; similarly, for trait 4 above society 5. For trait 3, the cutoff line 
can be placed above society 7 or 5 with the same number of errors (two). 
Using such a method (which is called the "Cornell technique"), cutoff 
points are placed where the short straight lines are drawn, and the derived 
coefficient of reproducibility is 1 - (5/40) = .875. In cases of larger 
matrices, the Cornell technique can result in still higher scores by re- 
arranging the rows and columns. However, as Edwards has pointed out, 
it then becomes impossible to predict the traits of a society with the accu- 
racy of the coefficient of reproducibility unless more information than the 
trait score is supplied. And I would add that there is no longer an unambi- 
guous ranking of traits and societies since, as demonstrated with trait 3, 
there are three different places where the cutoff point can be placed. 
Although both techniques are employed below, the results are quite 
similar: the Spearmen's coefficient of rank correlation between the country 
rankings using the two techniques is .98; and between the trait rankings 
(Experiment B), .95. 
It would be useful to have some measure of the statistical significance 
of the calculated coefficients of reproducibility, but so far no such measures 
are available. Part of the difficulty arises from a geometrical complication 
-if there is a small number of 1-values or 0-values, a random pattern 
would have a very much higher coefficient. One method of gaining insight 
into whether the derived pattern of 1- and 0-values (after the Goodenough- 
Edwards or the Cornell ranking technique has been employed) is statistic- 
ally meaningful is to compare the "errors" with that of a random pattern 
derived from a matrix of the same size and cutoff line as in the whole of the 
ranked matrix. For example, let us suppose that we have a matrix with 
ten societies and twenty traits and that there are forty I-values (20 percent 
of the ratings). If we use the Goodenough-Edwards technique, the cutoff 
line defines two areas with, respectively, forty and 160 ratings. Table 4 
shows how the comparison pattern is derived. 
The table is constructed by assuming that the number of 1-values and 
0-values are the same as the table to be examined but that the chances of 
either value appearing above or below the cutoff line depend only on the 
21 It can also easily be shown that the cofficient of reproducibility is the same if 
the cutoff point is measured horizontally (i.e., from the societies) rather than vertically 
(from the traits) when the Goodenough-Edwards technique is employed. 
423 
This content downloaded from 130.58.65.20 on Tue, 28 Apr 2015 19:56:01 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Economic Development and Cultural Change 
TABLE 4 
AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE DERIVATION OF THE COMPARATIVE "RANDOM" 
PATTERN 
Total Ratings* No. 0-Valuest No. 1-Valuest 
Above cutoff line ... 160 128 32 
Below cutoff line .... 40 32 8 
Total ............ 200 160 40 
* 200 in example. 
t 80 percent in example. 
t 20 percent in example. 
number of ratings defined by this line. The patterns derived from the ranked 
table and from the "random" table are then compared, and a simple X2 
calculation is carried out to see if they differ.22 
Turning now to the specific problem at hand, the relative levels of 
economic development of the 100 primitive societies in the sample were 
determined by a scalogram using 156 different traits. In selecting them, I 
took advantage of some generally accepted propositions about the mani- 
festations of economic development as reflected in the complexity of the 
economy. More specifically, a higher stage of economic development is 
reflected by: a finer division of labor, a higher level of technology, a greater 
diversity of production above the bare subsistence level, and a greater 
elaborateness of economic organization. Thus, traits were selected that 
are related to the existence of specific occupations (examples are given in 
table I above); technology (e.g., existence of the plow, existence of bridges 
or sewers, use of arch in architecture, etc.); consumption products above 
those food products needed for subsistence (e.g., glass or pottery items, 
metal luxury goods, etc.); and complex economic institutions (e.g., large 
urban settlements, guilds, wage labor, permanent markets, etc.). Pre- 
liminary tests showed that the derived rank orders of societies were 
significantly highly correlated when ranked separately by each of these 
criteria. 
22 My technique of comparing the results to a random pattern and then calculat- 
ing a x2 statistic is a variant of a technique analyzed by Karl F. Schuessler ("A Note 
on Statistical Significance of Scalograms," Sociometry 24 [September 1961]: 312-18). 
It must be noted that this technique does not prove that traits form a cumulative 
scale but rather that the traits vary significantly from a random pattern in the two 
areas defined by the cutoff point. This test is, however, quite suited for testing 
"necessary but not sufficient" conditions; a test of sufficiency would involve examina- 
tion of the proportion of errors in areas at different distances from the cutoff line. 
This x2 technique can also be used to examine the statistical significance of the scaling 
of a single row (see below). Other more-complex methods of statistical analysis are 
also available (Leo A. Goodman, "Simple [sic] Statistical Methods for Scalogram 
Analysis," Psychometrika 24 [March 1959]: 29-43, surveys this literature). However, 
the large size of the matrix and the particular way in which the hypotheses are stated 
make the above-described X2 test the most appropriate. 
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For the ranking of the traits and the societies, we have a matrix of 
15,600 items. Using the Goodenough-Edwards technique, I counted the 
items that did and did not appear in the proper place above and below the 
cutoff line and calculated a coefficient of reproducibility. With the same 
rank order of societies, I then rearranged the order of traits and, using the 
Cornell technique, calculated a new coefficient of reproducibility (Experi- 
ment A), which, as one would suspect, is somewhat higher. Then, I re- 
arranged both the order of the societies and the traits, and, using the 
Cornell technique again, calculated still another coefficient of reproduci- 
bility (Experiment B), which is slightly higher than that in the previous 
experiment.23 All of these results are presented in table 5 below. 
To gain perspective, I present comparison patterns calculated on the 
assumption that the proportion of 1- and 0-values is the same for the two 
areas defined by the cutoff line. Coefficients of reproducibility can also be 
calculated for these random pattern tables and are presented for com- 
parison purposes. Finally, I compare the actual and the random patterns 
and calculate a X2 statistic (1 degree of freedom). 
It should be clear that the coefficient of reproducibility in all three 
cases is considerably higher than that derived from a random pattern. The 
X2 coefficients derived from comparing the actual data to the random pattern 
are all statistically significant far above the .99 level. Although the use of 
the Cornell technique improves the coefficient of reproducibility, loosening 
the constraints about rearranging the rows and columns and about drawing 
the cutoff lines does not greatly change matters. 
Two conclusions of importance for this study can be drawn from these 
results. First, the 156 traits chosen appear to fall along a unidimensional 
scale that indicates the relative levels of economic development; that is, 
the scalogram technique based on traits related to economic complexity 
proves a satisfactory method. Second, both the Goodenough-Edwards and 
the Cornell technique yield quite satisfactory results, and, therefore, we 
must make a decision as to which is the most appropriate to use. Use of 
the Cornell technique (for both the matrix determining level of develop- 
ment and for the individual traits to be tested) gives higher X2 values than 
the Goodenough-Edwards technique (for both the matrix determining 
level of development and for the individual traits to be tested). Further- 
more, the former method also seems more appropriate if we are worried 
about necessary and sufficient conditions. Therefore, it was chosen. Lists 
of the 100 societies, the 156 traits and their rankings using the various 
23 This procedure was carried out by a semimechanized iterative process in which 
the computer printed out the matrix, decisions were made as to what rows or what 
columns were to be interchanged, proper instructions were given to the computer, 
and another matrix was printed out. The process continued until a close visual in- 
spection revealed no rearrangement that would result in fewer errors, a process that 
took nine iterations. Undoubtedly, more-refined methods would be able to reduce 
the errors somewhat, but the size of the matrix and the capacity of the small computer 
available to me prevented the use of such techniques. 
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RESULTS OF THE SCALING EXPERIMENTS 
GOODENOUGH-EDWARDS CORNELL TECHNIQUE CORNELL TECHNIQUE 
TECHNIQUE EXPERIMENT A EXPERIMENT B 
Data 
0-Values 1-Values Total 0-Values 1-Values Total 0-Values 1-Values Total 
Above cutoff line .... 12032 699 12731 12345 690 13035 12337 609 12946 Below cutoff line ..... 699 2170 2869 386 2179 2565 394 2260 2654 
Total ........... 12731 2869 15600 12731 2869 15600 12731 2869 15600 
"Random" Comparison Pattern 
0-Values 1-Values Total 0-Values 1-Values Total 0-Values 1-Values Total 
Above cutoff line .... 10390 2341 12731 10638 2397 13035 10580 2366 12946 
Below cutoff line ..... 2341 528 2869 2093 472 2565 1251 503 2654 
Total ........... 12731 2869 15600 12731 2869 15600 12731 2869 15600 
Summary Statistics 
Random Random Random 
Comparison Comparison Comparison Actual Data Pattern Actual Data Pattern Actual Data Pattern 
Total errors* ..................1398 4682 1076 4490 1006 4517 
Coefficient of reproducibility .. .91 .70 .93 .71 .94 .71 
X2t ......................... 7669. 9055. 9169. 
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* Zero-values where 1-values should be, and vice versa. 
t It must be emphasized that the x2 statistic relates to the difference between the actual and the random patterns, and, although 
it can be used to determine the degree to which the traits form a unidimensional scale, it does not directly measure a "goodness of 
fit." Two extreme patterns of the errors are possible to visualize. The errors could be clustered around the cutoff line, a phenome- 
non that would be consistent with the notion that the possibilities of observation errors in regard to the trait are greatest in those 
societies around this line. Or the errors could be randomly distributed. This latter pattern implies, not only that observation errors 
are minimized, but also, perhaps, that some unspecified factor is impinging upon the scale. For the scale to represent fully a uni- 
dimensional phenomenon, such a factor would have to be taken into account. 
One simple way of determining which error pattern is predominant is to count the number of errors in a band of societies 
around the cutoff line and compare the result with what would be expected if the errors were random. For the Cornell technique 
(Experiment B), the following results are obtained: If the band is defined as five societies on either side of the cutoff line, then, 
with the assumption of a random distribution of errors, we would expect to find ninety-eight errors (this is not exactly 10 percent 
of the total errors because at the extreme end of the matrix the band has less than five societies); in actuality, we find 202, or 2.0 
times as many). If the band is defined as ten societies on either side of the cutoff line, we would expect from an assumption about 
randomness 182 errors but find 390 (about 2.1 times as many) instead. It is noteworthy that the deviation from the random 
pattern is greater as the band becomes narrower. Thus, the first pattern-where the errors are clustered around the cutoff line- 
appears to predominate. Similar conclusions can be drawn from the matrices when the Goodenough-Edwards method is em- 
ployed. The results of this additional test thus give further confirmation of the correctness of the procedure we have followed. 
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techniques, and the results of the statistical tests using the Goodenough- 
Edward technique can be obtained from me. 
2. The Data 
The data used for making the scale analysis come from a team project 
directed by Robert L. Carneiro at the American Museum of Natural 
History (AMNH) in New York City. Basing its research on a list of 356 
traits,24 the AMNH team investigated 100 different primitive societies that 
were chosen so that societies from all different parts of the world are 
represented (in order to minimize influences of cultural diffusion). The raw 
materials were reports of field studies that have appeared in the anthro- 
pological literature for many decades. 
In order to gain some idea of the accuracy of this work, it is useful to 
cross-check these ratings against others that have been compiled. The data 
of thirty-two cross-cultural anthropological studies are summarized and 
analyzed in a book by Robert B. Textor,25 and, in addition, computer 
cards with such data are available from the Human Relations Area File 
at Yale University. 
Although Textor presents data for 400 societies, only fifty-five of them 
are the same as in the Carneiro study. And, out of the 536 traits presented 
by Textor, only thirty-three are sufficiently close to the Carneiro traits to 
warrant comparing. Finally, out of these thirty-three, only eighteen are 
economic traits that are used in this study. The results of such a comparison 
of these economic traits can be easily summarized.26 
Out of the 683 ratings of the eighteen economic traits for the different 
societies from the Textor and Carneiro studies that are comparable, the 
same results are obtained in 82 percent of the cases. Part of the disagree- 
ment can be traced to slightly different definitions and concepts used in 
the two studies. In order to take this into account, the eighteen sets of 
traits were rated according to the degree of closeness before the comparisons 
were actually carried out. In the most comparable group, the differences 
between the two studies is 10 percent; in the least comparable group, 26 
percent. Thus, the distribution of errors appears in the expected direction. 
The disagreements between the two sources can be investigated in 
other ways as well. First, the greatest amount of disagreement between the 
two sources should occur around the cutoff line, where random factors 
24 Robert L. Carneiro and Stephen F. Tobias, "Trait List to Be Used for the Study 
of Cultural Evolution by Means of Scale Analysis," 4th ed., mimeographed (New 
York: American Museum of Natural History, 1963). 
25 Textor (n. 11 above). Most of the cross-cultural tabulations summarized by 
Textor come from the materials of the Human Relations Area File (HRAF). The 
Carneiro-Tobias data were not taken from this source but rather from a wide number 
of monographs, many of which are not included in the HRAF materials. Thus, the 
comparisons between the Textor and Carneiro-Tobias data cover errors due to differ- 
ences in coding and, in part, to differences in observation. 
26 A more detailed summary can be obtained from me. 
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play the most important role. If the cutoff line (Goodenough-Edwards 
technique) is bracketed so that 20 percent of the societies for which data 
are available in both sources are included, then we should expect consider- 
ably more than 20 percent of the disagreements to fall within this range. 
Turning to the data, we find that 33 percent of the disagreements actually 
occur here. 
A greater-than-random number of disagreements between the two 
sources should also occur in the nonscale traits that fall outside the area 
bracketed around the cutoff line. That is, the further a society is from the 
cutoff line, the less likely it should have nonscale elements (have a 0 where 
1 should be, and vice versa). For any group of societies away from the 
bracketed area, the chances are more likely that there are coding errors for 
the nonscale elements than for the scale elements and, thus, for disagree- 
ment between the two sources. Away from the bracketed societies around 
the cutoff line, the two sources disagree in 15 percent of the comparable 
cases; but, for the nonscale elements in this set, the degree of disagree- 
ment is 23 percent, which, as predicted, is higher. 
Thus, correct predictions about the distribution of error in all of the 
tests can be made. Such results give us greater confidence in interpreting 
the data and in carrying out the statistical testing of hypotheses ahead. 
D. The Empirical Tests 
Most of the hypotheses can be validated by showing that the traits in 
question are "cumulative," that is, that after the societies have been ranked 
by level of economic development, the less advanced societies do not have 
the specified trait which appears in the advanced societies (where "more" 
and "less" advanced are determined by the cutoff line). 
The statistical procedures used in carrying out this task are similar 
to those used in table 5. The first step is to derive a "random" comparison 
pattern, and here we follow exactly the same method as before. For ex- 
ample, let us suppose that we have a sample of 200 societies and that 
forty of them have a particular trait (i.e., there are forty 1-values). Using 
the Goodenough-Edwards technique, the cutoff line defines two areas 
with, respectively, forty and 160 ratings; and a "random" comparison 
table is then constructed exactly as table 4. With the data, we arrange the 
societies according to the relative levels of economic development, draw a 
cutoff line, compare the results with the results from the random pattern, 
and finally calculate a X2 to see if they differ to a significant extent. 
A statistic very similar to the coefficient of reproducibility can also 
be calculated for each trait which provides a useful summary measure. 
The formula is: modified reproducibility coefficient equals unity minus the 
ratio errors to the total number of societies in the sample. 
The statistical test shows significant deviations from the random 
pattern, but does not distinguish between those where sufficient conditions 
are stated (where all of the societies above the cutoff line have the trait 
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TABLE 6 
RESULTS OF THE STATISTICAL TESTS (CORNELL TECHNIQUE)* 
Rank in Coefficient 
Percentages Development of 
Societies of Societies Matrix of Reproduci- 
Hypotheses in Sample with Trait Trait bility C-Measure X2 Trait 
Property Rights in Factors of Production 
Al, A2, A3.. 100 32 25 .84 .31 39.29 War captives or persons bought outside the society, 
kept as slaves, and usually not adopted, liberated, 
or killed subsequently (i.e., extrasocietal slavery) 
Al, A2, A3.. 100 19 57-65 .90 .40 41.53 Debtors or criminals made slaves, or other free- 
born members of the society (including wives and 
children) sold into slavery (i.e., intrasocietal 
slavery) 
A4 ......... 100 34 19 .83 .53 29.04 Landed property: continuous ownership rights 
exercised by individuals or families over land 
which has been improved, even after cultivated 
plot, house site, etc., is abandoned 
A5 ......... 100 11 127-140 .95 .40 51.64 Rental of land or dwellings by landlords to tenants 
as a common system of tenure 
Transfer of Property Rights 
B1 ......... 100 68 12 .79 .33 32.87 Most individual (not family) property transmitted 
by inheritance rather than being destroyed at 
death of owner 
B2 ......... 45 49 11 .78 .20 13.93 Rules of inheritance governing real property 
B2 ......... 41 78 3 .80 .25 4.79 Rules of inheritance governing movable property 
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Transfer of Property Rights (continued) 
B3 ......... 100 24 47-50 .87 .23 38.22 Testamentary disposition of property, by a written 
will through a formal executor or orally in the 
presence of a witness 
B4 ......... 100 27 27 .88 .42 46.45 Agricultural land reverts to chief, king, or state as 
personal property or for reassignment when owner 
abandons the land or dies without heirs (i.e., 
escheat) 
B5 ......... 100 22 38 .87 .46 36.51 Certain offenses punished by confiscation of pro- 
perty, of which part may go to the offended party 
Delineation of Property Rights 
C1 ......... 100 35 15 .88 .25 59.15 Continuous boundaries (other than growing food 
plants) delimit agricultural fields (e.g., fences, rows, 
or walls of stone, paths, ditches, hedges) 
C2 ......... 100 6 127-40 .98 .50 67.68 Inscription of land or other forms of property 
(registry of deeds) 
C3 ......... 100 13 56-65 .98 .00 82.71 Recorded inventories of wealth (e.g., with pebbles, 
knotted cords, notched sticks, clay tablets) 
Generalized Property Rights: Money 
DI ......... 100 28 34 .83 .47 31.23 Occurrence of standardized medium of exchange D2 ......... 100 6 127-40 .96 .75 41.65 Coined money 
D3 ......... 100 8 127-40 .94 1.00 29.85 Taxation in money 
D4 ......... 100 13 66-72 .91 .56 31.92 Money of goods lent out at interest 
* The X2 statistics have 1 degree of freedom; a coefficient of 3.48 is significant at the .95 level; and 6.64, at the .99 level. The C measure (clus- 
tering measure) is defined in the text. The "rank in development matrix of trait" shows the rank order of the trait if it had been part of the matrix 
with which the relative levels of development were determined. (This was determined by comparing the cutoff point of the trait with the number 
of the trait in the development matrix with the same cutoff point.) The data for hypothesis B2 come from Textor (reporting Murdoch's EA74 and 
EA76 traits); all the rest of the data comes from Carneiro. 
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while none of those below the line do) and where necessary but not suffi- 
cient conditions occur (where some of the societies above the cutoff line 
have the trait while none of those below do). Since the hypotheses are 
stated in terms of necessary but not sufficient conditions, this is not 
disturbing. The results of the X2 tests as well as calculations of the coeffi- 
cient or reproducibility and the percentage of societies with the given 
trait are summarized in table 6 below. 
The first three hypotheses concern the presence of slavery and, from 
the table, it is clear that both intra- and extrasocietal slavery are cumulative 
traits. 
The first two hypotheses deal with the relative level of economic 
development at which slavery appears; and the most direct evidence of this 
is found in the rank order of traits composing the scale that are presented. 
The key question is the relative position of the slavery traits in regard to 
two crucial traits: "agriculture provides the major part of subsistence" 
and "a surplus of food regularly produced over and above the annual 
subsistence needs of the food producers and not consumed by them." 
Both of these crucial traits are cumulative, and the former occurs at a 
lower stage of economic development than the slavery traits.27 Therefore, 
hypothesis Al about slavery occurring in agricultural rather than hunting 
and gathering societies is confirmed. Intrasocietal slavery also occurs 
above the surplus point, although extratribal slavery does not. Thus, 
hypothesis A2 about slavery occurring only in those societies well above 
the subsistence level receives only partial confirmation. If extrasocietal 
slaves are poorly fed and worked to death, then an implicit assumption of 
the original hypothesis is changed, and the actual results can be 
rationalized. 
Hypothesis A3 about extrasocietal slavery preceding intrasocietal 
slavery appears confirmed, because many more societies possess the former 
trait and the cutoff line is at a much lower level of development for the 
former than for the latter trait. 
Hypothesis A4 concerns the existence of continuous-ownership 
rights over improved land after a certain level of development and is 
more easily validated. Here, the only important test is whether the trait is 
cumulative, a factor which is demonstrated by the very high x2 statistic. 
The final hypothesis of the group (A5)-that rental of land or dwellings 
is a common form of tenure at high levels of economic development-is 
similarly validated by the high X2 statistic. This proposition, in turn, is 
based on the notion that at higher levels of economic development there 
is greater economic inequality, a phenomenon for which indirect evidence 
is available for only a small sample.28 
27 These traits are, respectively, trait 11 and trait 36 in the rankings (Cornell 
technique), where the lowest number signifies that the trait occurs at a lower level of 
economic development. The X2 statistics are significant. 
28 Hypothesis A5 is based on an argument concerning greater economic ine- 
quality at higher levels of economic development. Additional evidence on this matter 
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Hypotheses B1, B2, and B3, all deal with inheritance regulations, and 
in testing them several minor problems arise. Hypothesis BI states that, 
after a certain level of development, property is transmitted by inheritance 
rather than being destroyed at death. Such a trait turns out to be cumula- 
tive (according to the X2 test), and the hypothesis appears validated. 
Hypothesis B2 deals with formal inheritance procedures for movable pro- 
perty preceding procedures for real property. Both of these types of in- 
heritance arrangements appear cumulative, but several difficulties of 
interpretation arise. First, the data for B2 come from a different source 
than for hypothesis BI and show that inheritance regulations are intro- 
duced at a somewhat earlier stage on the developmental scale. Second, the 
cumulative nature of inheritance of movable property is just barely statistic- 
ally significant and, if we use the Goodenough-Edwards technique 
instead, falls slightly below the limit of significance. Nevertheless, it does 
appear that inheritance rules governing movable property occurred at an 
earlier developmental stage than for real property. And, combining the 
information from the two hypotheses, the following pattern seems clear: 
At the lowest levels of economic development, most individual property 
is destroyed at the death of the owner. At higher development levels, 
regulations for the inheritance of movable property appears; and, at a 
somewhat higher development levels, rules for the inheritance of real 
(land and structures) property exist. Such a pattern, in turn, offers strong 
evidence for the notion that family ownership of real property precedes 
individual ownership, which is a commonplace among anthropologists. 
Hypothesis B3 concerns testamentary disposition of property and is 
significantly related to the level of economic development. As predicted, 
such a trait appears at a much higher level of economic development than 
where rules of inheritance first appear. The appearance of escheat (hypo- 
thesis B4) and of the confiscation of property for punishment (hypothesis 
B5) also are significantly related to the level of economic development and 
are thus validated. 
Three hypotheses are offered above that link particular ways in which 
property rights are delineated with the level of economic development: 
more specifically, the existence of continuous boundaries delimiting 
agricultural fields (Cl), the formal inscription of land through a registry 
of deeds (C2), and the private recorded inventories of wealth (C3) are 
related to the relative level of economic development. Further, the first 
trait should appear first in societies ranked according to development, 
followed by the third, and then the second. The three hypotheses are 
validated by the high X2 statistics (which show that they are cumulative 
can be gained from Textor's FC137, which concerns the existence of invidious dis- 
plays of wealth. For the thirty societies which overlap the sample of societies used in 
this study, the trait appears to be cumulative, although there is a slight ambiguity. 
Using the Goodenough-Edwards technique, the X2 is somewhat below the required 
confidence limit; using the Cornell technique, the x2 is above this limit. Although a 
larger sample would be desirable in order to study this trait more extensively, the 
results do appear consistent with the hypothesis under examination. 
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traits) and by the relative number of societies that have each trait (which 
designate the relative points along the development scale at which the 
traits appear). 
The final group of hypotheses deal with the existence of general 
property rights, particularly in relation to the occurrence of money. All 
four traits are significantly cumulative, as shown by the high X2 statistic. 
Hypothesis D 1, that the existence of a standardized medium of exchange is 
related to the level of economic development, is thus validated. Hypothesis 
D2, that coined money appears at a higher stage of development, is vali- 
dated by the high X2 and the fact that many fewer societies possess this 
trait than the former. Hypothesis D3, that at the same or higher develop- 
mental stage taxes are collected in money, is also confirmed: the trait is 
cumulative and appears at roughly the same time as coined money. 
Hypothesis D4 is that at some point along the development scale after 
the appearance of a standardized medium of exchange, loans at interest 
occur. Again, the evidence is positive. 
The positive evidence for the seventeen hypotheses is impressive. The 
cost/benefit technique permits a number of varied hypotheses about the 
cumulative nature of certain economic traits to be generated for which 
the empirical evidence appears strong. Certain problems arise, however, 
in regard to the pattern of errors which deserves further attention. Such 
difficulties can be seen most clearly if the hypotheses themselves are 
strengthened. 
As I emphasized, the hypotheses are stated in terms of "necessary 
but not sufficient" conditions and, as such, remain relatively weak. Let us 
add an additional assumption: groups of men in primitive and peasant 
societies have a keen sense of their economic interests; and, if the economic 
potential for a particular property institution exist, the force of these 
interests leads to the establishment of the institution in question. We have 
now changed the hypotheses so that development is a sufficient condition 
for a property institution to appear. Further statistical tests are now 
necessary. 
As noted above, the X2 test employed in this study relates the observed 
pattern to a random pattern; and it should be clear that, the fewer the 
errors, the more closely related the trait to the level of economic develop- 
ment. From table 6 the reader can see that the errors are generally few and 
that the coefficients of reproducibility and the x2 coefficients are generally 
quite high. Examination of the pattern of errors now allows an interesting 
test to be made: if the errors cluster around the cutoff line, then there is a 
high probability that they are due to observational errors or small errors 
in scaling; if the errors are randomly distributed, then other factors may 
have to be taken into consideration before "sufficient" conditions for the 
various property institutions can be established. 
To examine these matters systematically, we can employ a technique 
used in others parts of this paper to compare the percentage of errors 
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within a zone around the cutoff line with the percentage that we would 
expect from a random distribution of errors. For simplicity, the zone is 
defined as 10 percent of the societies above and below the cutoff line; 
therefore, we would expect 20 percent of the errors to fall within this zone. 
In table 6 the C-measure (clustering measure) is the actual percentage of 
errors falling within the defined zone, using the Cornell technique to 
define the cutoff line (the Goodenough-Edwards technique yields similar 
results). 
In almost every case, more errors appear in the bracketed zone than 
would appear if they were distributed randomly (i.e., the C-measure is 
over .20 in all cases). In ten out of the seventeen traits that are examined, 
the C-measure is .40 or higher; that is, the actual errors are two times or 
more greater in number than expected within the zone. Thus, a large 
proportion of the recorded "errors" are probably due to statistical mis- 
takes rather than to the economic reality under examination. 
Since the remaining errors are relatively few, several interpretations 
are open to us. First, we could dismiss the remaining errors (i.e., the errors 
outside the bracketed areas) as due to random factors that act to offset 
the more basic economic forces in special circumstances. Second, we could 
argue that such errors are consistent with the hypotheses stated with 
necessary rather than sufficient conditions, but this approach implies a 
particular pattern of errors, namely, that the "errors" outside the bracketed 
area consist solely of traits not appearing in societies above the stage of 
development embodying the necessary conditions for that trait. Unfor- 
tunately, the pattern of errors does not appear like this but rather is 
roughly equally distributed on either side of the bracketed area. Third, we 
might argue that the economic-development factors play a very important 
but not a completely exclusive role in the appearance of particular property 
rights and institutions and that we cannot be completely sure of the critical 
mechanisms until alternative hypotheses to explain the same general 
phenomena are tested. I waver between the first and third interpretations, 
depending upon my state of modesty at the time, and must leave this issue 
to the reader. 
Interpretation of my results requires a brief discussion of one last 
major question: to what extent can one use these cross-section results to 
generalize about the development of property rights and institutions over 
time ? Since most of the relevant issues of this controversy have been often 
discussed in both the economic and anthropology literature, my comments 
can be brief. 
In regard to my scale of economic development, it should be clear that 
because of the possibilities of diffusion, it is possible that some of the traits 
would be in a somewhat different order on the development scale if time- 
series data were analyzed in a similar way. For example, because of 
contact with Europeans, use of certain technologies might appear now in 
much less economically developed societies than in the past, where such 
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technologies had to be invented by members of the society itself. Neverthe- 
less, such changes in the ranking of traits and, perhaps, of several tribes 
should not deflect attention from the basic idea that, at a single point in 
time or over time, complexity is a unidimensional phenomenon that can 
be scaled.29 Further, this does not imply that a society cannot retrogress 
economically, but rather that, if it does retrogress, there is a certain pattern 
that can be predicted.30 
For the property institutions examined in this study, three questions 
can be asked: Would they scale with time-series data ? Would they appear 
at the same point on the scale? And would they appear in the same 
order? 
The theoretical justifications of the various hypotheses suggests that 
they would scale, an assertion for which there is also a certain amount of 
positive empirical evidence to support.31 We would not expect cutoff lines 
of the property institutions to be at exactly the same point on the develop- 
ment scale as in the cross-section study. But, for those institutions in 
which relative ranks with other traits (e.g., intrasocietal slavery institutions 
appearing after societies are above a bare subsistence level) or relative 
ranks with other property institutions (e.g., inheritance of personal 
property preceding inheritance of real property) are important, we would 
expect that the same relative ranks would obtain because of the theoretical 
justifications offered in the previous section. 
E. Summary and Conclusions 
In this essay, I have examined seventeen hypotheses about the relation- 
ship of property rights and institutions to economic development which 
were derived from a rough judgment about the economic costs and benefits 
involved in each. By examining the existence of such institutions in 100 
primitive societies that have been ranked according to their relative levels 
of economic development, positive evidence of the hypotheses appeared 
in every case. Although the hypotheses were stated in terms of necessary 
conditions, with an additional hypothesis about the great importance of the 
role of economic interests in primitive societies, the stated conditions 
become sufficient for the existence of the property institution under 
examination. Certain additional evidence for this matter is adduced from 
the data as well. Three general conclusions can be drawn from such an 
exercise: 
First, for some economic institution, it is not necessary to take into 
account the social matrix of an economy in order to predict their occurrence. 
That is, considerations of the level of economic development appear to 
29 Empirical evidence on this matter is presented by Carneiro, "Ascertaining, 
Testing, and Interpreting Sequences of Cultural Development" (n. 16 above). 
30 This is not to deny that some type of hysteresis effect might be present but, 
rather, that if a society retrogresses, there is a great probability that those traits that 
are highest on the trait list will be lost first. 
31 Carneiro, "Ascertaining, Testing, and Interpreting" (n. 16 above). 
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transcend particular cultural, social, or political considerations that might 
lead the investigator to make a more complicated theoretical analysis than 
necessary. 
Second, the scalogram technique, which I have used to rank the 
societies according to their relative level of economic development, is an 
analytical tool which can be of considerable use to economists. Since it 
allows quantification of qualitative data, it can be used, not only in 
analyzing institutions (as I have employed it), but also in many other cases 
where one may wish to scale attitudes, or patterns of activities, or proper- 
ties where metric devices cannot be directly applied. 
Finally, by taking account of some very simple cost/benefit considera- 
tions, it is possible to make accurate predictions about relationships 
between economic development and property institutions. Since property 
rights and institutions structure the pattern of decision making which 
influences economic activity, we can analyze at least one facet of a subject 
that has been too long neglected by economists. A general positive theory 
of property lies far in the future. But, since we may be reaching the point 
of diminishing returns from multiequational descriptions of economies, it 
might be useful to begin a more systematic analysis of the economic 
institutions that underlie the dry equations. 
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